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AMICUS CURIAE: FRIEND OR FOE? THE LIMITS
OF FRIENDSHIP IN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE
"An attorney of our acquaintanceonce told the court, when
askedfor his response to the argument of the amicus, 'That fellow
isn't any more a friend of the court than I am. ,,P
I. INTRODUCTION
You have a client named Tom. He sells widgets. Then, there is
Jerry. He sells an equally imaginative product. Jerry, however, is involved in a lawsuit concerning his product, the repercussions of which
will affect Tom's interests. Your client lacks standing to bring an action
as a named party, because he fails to meet the requirements set forth in
Article III of the United States Constitution and in the Federal Rules.2
What do you do?

'Strasser v. Doorley, 432 F.2d 567, 569 n.2 (1st Cir. 1970).
2

See U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2, cl. 1 (requiring that cases "aris[e] under this Con-

stitution"); FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (allowing joinder if needed for just adjudication); FED. R.
Civ. P. 23 (allowing members of class to sue or be sued if several prerequisites are met);
FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (allowing for intervention of right and permissive intervention in
certain circumstances). Article III of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent
part: "The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States .... U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2, cl. 1. The
Court in Valley Forge Christian College v. American Unitedfor Separation of Church
and State, Inc., read Article III as requiring parties to "show that [they] personally [have]
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of
the defendant." 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)). See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 73132 (1972) (interpreting Article III as prohibiting advisory opinions and requiring parties
to have concrete stake in outcome of controversy). The Federal Rules impose further
standing requirements on potential litigants in the form of intervention of right and permissive intervention. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. Rule 24 provides that intervention as of right
shall be permitted when a statute allows intervention or when the applicant is not adequately represented by the existing parties and disposition of the case will impair or
impede the applicant's ability to protect their interest in the subject of the action. Id.
Permissive intervention may be permitted when a statute allows intervention or when
applicant's claim or defense shares a question of law or fact with the main action. Id.
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One possibility is to serve as amicus curiae and file an amicus
brief with the court.3 Amicus briefs allow third parties to intervene
without satisfying the prerequisites of Article III or the Federal Rules.
Although amici curiae are versatile and permeate nearly every facet of
our legal system, their efficacy is limited.4 As an illustration of these
limits, assume arguendo that Congress substituted a true democracy for
our republican form of government. Although a popular vote would incorporate a greater variety of perspectives than a representative form of
government, the efficiency and practicability of a popular vote in everyday legislation would be limited. Coordinating national balloting for
each of the many issues that arise each day would be overwrought with
confusion and burdened by complexity. The amicus curiae device may
be likened to a democracy: It would afford the court additional perspectives,5 but its application to everyday litigation would be impracticable,
3 Cf United States v. State of Michigan, 116 F.R.D. 655, 664 (W.D. Mich. 1987)
(granting litigating amicus status to private amicus); Northside Indep. Sch. Dist. of Bexar
v. Texas Educ. Agency 410 F. Supp. 360, 362-63 (W.D. Tex. 1975) (authorizing amicus
curiae to conduct discovery as parties to litigation); United States v. Texas, 356 F. Supp.
469, 473 (E.D. Tex. 1972) (authorizing amicus curiae to enforce district court's judgment); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1125 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (authorizing amicus curiae to present and question witnesses).

'See Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Amicus Curiae Participationin U.S. Supreme Court Litigation:An Appraisal of Hakman's "Folklore," 16, 2 L. & Soc'Y REV.
311, 317 (1981-82) (indicating pervasiveness of amicus curiae in American court system). By 1980, amicus briefs were being filed in more than half of all noncommercial,
full opinion cases, including a diverse and comprehensive assortment of both civil and
criminal cases. Id. at 317. There were four or more amicus briefs filed in over one
quarter of these cases. Id. Some have characterized this trend toward increased amicus
filings as the rule rather than the exception. Id. at 318. See also Samuel Krislov, The
Amicus CuriaeBrief. From Friendshipto Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694, 695 (1963) (discussing pervasive, evolution of amicus briefs and their limitations); Cf. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 495 (1989) (representing pervasiveness of amicus briefs by accepting seventy-eight briefs, which were filed with this case). The
courts' failure to prescribe a precise definition for amici curiae has increased the versatility of the device. See infra notes 13-31 and accompanying text (discussing metamorphosis of amicus curiae doctrine).
See generally Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062,
1063 (7th Cir. 1997) (opining limits, such as, amicus status only for parties offering
different perspectives than named parties); United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 164
(6th Cir. 1991) (stating amicus curiae's purpose as providing impartial information on
matters of public interest); Miller-Wohl, Inc. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., Mont.,
694 F.2d 203, 204 (9th Cir. 1982) (describing amicus curiae's role as directing court on
matters of public interest to law); New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University
of Colo., 592 F.2d 1196, 1198 n.3 (Ist Cir. 1979) (observing amicus focus on legal questions before court not partisan questions of fact); 4 Am. Jur. 2d Amicus Curiae§ 1
(1995) (describing traditional amicus curiae as neutrally providing information to court).
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resulting in confusion and delay. 6 Our forefathers found the necessary
limits for a working democracy in the form of a republic. We must now
do the same for amici curiae. These limits are the focus of this note:
7
namely, what are the proper limits for amici curiae in America today?
This note begins by introducing a few of the strengths and weaknesses of the amicus curiae.8 The discussion then traces the metamorphosis of the amicus curiae, from its modest beginnings in Rome to its
Kafka-esque birth in America. 9 Specifically, the note reveals how, at the
expense of Constitutional provisions and legislative regulations, the unfettered evolution of amicus curiae doctrine has afforded third parties
rights typically enjoyed by named parties. 0 Remedial constructions,
posited by modern courts under the rubric of governmental and litigating
amici curiae, have been inadequate and misdirected."' This note will
ultimately examine court reactions and propose alternatives better suited
to the strengths and weaknesses of amicus curiae in America.' 2 Ultimately, however, this note is like the amicus curiae, with the strength of
analysis and the weakness of being limited to that analysis.

See generally Webster, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (reviewing seventy-eight amicus
briefs filed in case); United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 166 (6th Cir. 1991) (observing that court-conferred litigating rights caused discord, confrontation, continuing
acrimony, and confusion); David B. Smallman, Amicus Practice,25 LmG., No. 2 Winter
1999, 27 (citing average case load for active circuit court judge as 449 cases for 255
working days); John Howard, Retaliation, Reinstatement, and Friendsof the Court:
Amicus Participationin Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 31 How. L.J. 241,255 (1988)
(opining that Supreme Court reviews more briefs from amici than from parties); Fowler
V. Harper & Edwin D. Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U. PA. L. REV.
1172, 1172-73 (1953) (indicating connection between amicus curiae's increased filing
and Supreme Court's enactment of limitations on them).
Cf. Krislov, supra note 4, at 695-96 (stating that courts always avoided precise
definitions of parameters and attendant circumstances of amicus curiae).
8

See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.

9See infra notes 13-31 and accompanying text.

'0See infra notes 32-85 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 86-103 and accompanying text.
1See infra notes 103-23 and accompanying text.
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II. METAMORPHOSIS: THE BIRTH AND REBIRTH OF THE
AMICUS CURIAE
Amicus curiae literally denotes "friend of the court.' 3 In the
fourteenth century and under Roman law, serving as a friend to the court
was also its doctrinal purpose.' 4 In the past, courts would appoint attorneys to submit non-binding written opinions.' 5 As neutral advisors, the
amicus' job was both to educate the court on various aspects of the law
responsibility was to
and to help it avoid error. 16 The amici curiae's only
7
remain loyal to the court and serve it exclusively.
The English court expanded the doctrine of amicus curiae in
1736.18 In Coxe v. Phillips,'9 the amicus helped the court avoid error by
noting that the lawsuit before the court was collusive and intended only
to attack the amicus' own marital status. 2° The amicus managed to serve

" See Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th
Cir. 1997) (defining amicus curiae as "friend of the court, not friend of a party");
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 43 (5th ed. 1983) (providing general definition).
14See Michael K. Lowman, The LitigatingAmicus Curiae: When Does The Party
Begin After the Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U.L. REV. 1243, 1244 (1992) (noting that traditional role of amicus curiae was as impartial assistant to judiciary); Harper & Etherington, supra note 6, at 1176 (discussing amicus curiae's honored position in Roman times).
15See Comment, The Amicus Curiae, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 469, 469 n.3 (1960)
[hereinafter, Comment, Amicus Curiae] (detailing role of amicus curiae as one of educator and friend of courts); cf.John Koch, Comment, Making Room: New Directionsin
Third Party Intervention, 48 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 151, 157 n.26 (1989) (noting
primary manner of performing duties as American amicus is by written brief); Eugene R.
Fridell, Befriending the Court: A Few Words of Amicus Briefs, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 5,
1983, at 8, 9 (highlighting oral argument for amici as exception to general rule of submitting written briefs); FED. R. App. P. 29 (permitting amici to participate in oral argument in extraordinary circumstances).
" See Comment, Amicus Curiae, supra note 15, at 469 n.3 (discussing role of amicus curiae).
" See Miller-Wohl Inc. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., Mont., 694 F.2d 203,
204 (9th Cir. 1982) (emphasizing that amicus is not party to litigation); Comment, Amicus Curiae, supra note 15, at 469 n.3 (discussing amicus curiae's purpose under Roman
Law); Lowman, supra note 14, at 1244 (describing amicus as court assistant).
18
See generally Ernest Angell, The Amicus Curiae:American Development of
English Institutions, 16 INT'L CoMp. L.Q. 1017, 1017 (1967) (tracing development of
amicus curiae from Roman Law to present Anglo-American device).
1
20

95 Eng. Rep. 152 (K.B. 1736).
Id.
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as a friend of the court while simultaneously protecting his own interests,
marking the demise of the fourteenth century exclusivity requirement.2
The adversarial nature of the American legal system is at variance
with third party representation in litigation. 22 This variance has transformed the traditional concept of amicus curiae. 13 Modem amicus curiae
doctrine has evolved with twentieth century litigation.24 Modem litigation often involves complex subject matter, issues of public importance,
and/or matters affecting third parties that are incapable of satisfying
standing or intervention requirements. 25 Although this modem-day
metamorphosis of amicus curiae tradition may be consistent with modem-day litigation, Constitutional requirements, 26 judicial precedents, 7
and legislative enactments2s continue to exclude third parties from litigation. 29 The judiciary has reacted to this conflict by allowing government
and private attorneys to serve as litigating amici curiae, thereby circum21

See Krislov, supra note 4, at 697 (noting dual interests being served and ex-

panding role of amicus curiae).
See id. at 696 (warning third party representation is "one of most serious and enduring shortcomings of adversary system").
2 See id. at 699-702 (discussing introduction of amicus curiae into American system).
24
See Lowman, supra note 14, at 1255 (citing Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts
and Social Policy, 4 (1977)) (criticizing courts for limiting themselves to their traditional
judicial roles instead of important social issues).
See id. (providing general background of relationship of amicus curiae and
courts).
See U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2, cl. I (requiring that cases "aris[e] under this Constitution"). See also supra, note 2 and accompanying text (discussing requirements to
bring action as named party).
27
See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,100 (1979) (noting
concerns that plaintiffs assert their own distinct interests, rather than those of third parties); United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 165-66 (6th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing
amici from real parties in interest); Miller-Wohl, Inc. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., Mont., 694 F.2d 203, 204 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating reluctance to give party powers to
nonparties and requiring granted petition to intervene).
2 See FED. R. CIv. P. 24. (West 1999). Intervention as of right shall be permitted
when a statute allows intervention or when the applicant is not adequately represented by
the existing parties and disposition of the case will impair or impede an applicant's ability to protect their interest in the subject of the action. Id. Permissive intervention may
be permitted when a statute allows intervention, or when applicant's claim or defense
shares a question of law or fact with the main action. Id.
See Lowman, supra note 14, at 1299 n.51 (citing Stephen L. Wasby, The Supreme Court in the FederalJudicialSystem, 110 (2d. ed. 1984)) (concluding limiting
access to federal courts enhances adversarial process, which further limits third party
representation).
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venting the Constitutional and statutory restrictions, which previously
restrained third party involvement. 30 Notwithstanding the judiciary's
good intentions, the removal of restrictions on third party involvement
has metamorphosed the amicus curiae doctrine into an adversarial
weapon.3'
III. "FRIENDSHIP IS FEIGNING

32

The amicus curiae doctrine made its first appearance in American
jurisprudence in 1823. 33 In Green v. Biddle,34 the State of Kentucky
served as amicus and helped the Court avoid error by noting that the lawsuit before the Court was collusive.35 Similar to Coxe v. Phillips,36 the
Green Court premised amicus status on helping the court avoid error
while simultaneously using it to represent the State of Kentucky's own
interests.37 This representation of dual interests expanded the doctrine of
amicus curiae in America, as it had in England, to include the interests of
both the court and amicus.38 Yet unlike the Coxe court, the Court in

soSee Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J.
1355, 1373-74 (1991) (proposing how litigating amici can circumvent many impediments and provide remedies); Krislov, supra note 2, at 699 (theorizing that amicus curiae
made it easier for third-party representation).
"i See infra notes 32-48 and accompanying text (illustrating judiciary's role in
transforming amicus curiae from unbiased informant to advocate).
3 See William Shakespeare, As You Like It act 2, sc. 7.
33 See Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 1, 3 (1823) (recognizing novelty of amicus issue).
34 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 1 (1823).

at 18.
Eng. Rep. 152
37 Compare Coxe, 95 Eng. Rep. 152 (informing court that lawsuit was pursued
36Seeid.

36 95

only to attack amicus' marital status) with Green, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) at 17-18 (informing
court that state interests were unrepresented). In Coxe, the court's holding, which is
predicated on error, expanded amicus doctrine to include serving the amicus' own interests. Coxe, 95 Eng. Rep. at 152. Similarly, in Green, the court's holding, which is also
predicated on error, expanded the doctrine in America to include serving a governmental
interest. Green, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) at 17.
3

8See Green, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) at 17-18 (broadening role of amicus curiae);
Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 621 (1854) (stating U.S. attorney's right to serve
as amicus in matters affecting boundaries of states); The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 1 (1821) (representing U.S. government view on treaty). These holdings should
not suggest that, in filing its amicus briefs, the U.S. represented solely its own interests.
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Green provided for the interests of a governmental entity rather than a
private third party. 39 This initially minor factual distinction would soon
develop into a major doctrinal divergence in American jurisprudence. 40
The next major evolution of the American amicus curiae occurred
when courts began providing for the interests of private amici .41 There
are now two major categories of amici curiae: private and governmental
amici. 42 Governmental amici are afforded all rights of a real party in
interest; this is consonant with established legal doctrine. 3 In United
States v. Michigan, however, the court also allowed private amici to advocate for a party position. 44 This created a second category of amici
curiae in the form of private amici.45 Private amici have fewer rights
than named-parties because their existence is inconsistent with our legal
system.46 In terms of serving as a friend to the court, private amici are
generally less objective than governmental amici: Government amici
endeavor for the public interest while private parties often labor for
themselves.47 While the actions of government amici are consistent with

Cf. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 478 (1812) (representing views
of foreign embassy on court's suggestion).
3,See Green, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) at 17-18 (granting state of Kentucky's request for
rehearing on grounds that state interests were not represented).
40 See infra notes 104-12 and accompanying text (addressing applicability of amicus curiae doctrine to government and private amici).
4" See United States v. State of Michigan, 116 F.R.D.655, 665 (W.D. Mich. 1987)
(granting full litigating amicus status to private amicus).
42 See Comment, Amicus Curiae, supra note 15, at 480-81 (listing types of amici:
governmental amici, public interest amici, and private special interest group amici).
Actually, the categories can be accurately grouped into two groups: governmental amici
and private amici. Krislov, supra note 4, at 609, 702; Lowman, supra note 14, at 1267.
"See Comment, Amicus Curiae, supra note 15, at 480 (affording governmental
amici latitude because representing public welfare allows for accurate prediction of contemplated regulation).
"See State of Michigan, 116 F.R.D. at 664 (granting full litigating amicus status
to private amicus).
See id. (granting Knop class all rights of named party).
See U.S. v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 165-66 (6th Cir. 1991) (stressing distinction
between amicus curiae and named parties). The court in Michigan held that the amici
lacked standing to be a real party in interest. Id. at 165. Moreover, standing may only be
acquired pursuant to the Federal Rules. Id. These rules may not be evaded by judicial
legerdemain. Id.
7
See generally Michigan, 940 F.2d at 166 (observing that amici subverted rights
of original parties and exacerbated proceedings).
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named parties, private amici may represent competing interests." The
disparity between the limited rights afforded to private amici and the
expansive rights afforded to government amici has served as the proverbial battleground for amici curiae in America.4 9

A. Government Amici
The granting of near-party status to government amici is proper
because it serves the court's end, is consistent with established legal
principles, and has limiting provisions. 50 Like their fourteenth century
Roman predecessors, government amici educate the court and help it to
avoid error. 5' Additionally, the government has the unparalleled ability
" See Lowman, supra note 14 at 1267 (observing transformation of public interest
groups from providing information to active involvement in litigation).
4 See id. (attributing private litigating amici
status to court's failure to distinguish
between private and government amici).
so See generally id. at 1261-64 (discussing "[g]ovemmental bodies acting as amicus curiae").
6' See Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797, 805 (8th Cir. 1958) (stating custom
of district courts to ask executive branch for aid and advice); City of Grand Rapids v.
Consumers' Power Co., 185 N.W. 852, 854 (Mich. 1921) (observing that leave is generally granted in cases involving questions of important public interest); Arthur F. Greenbaum, Government Participationin PrivateLitigation, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 853, 972 (Winter, 1989) (noting courts "welcome Government participation when confronting complex
issues of law arising from federal regulatory programs"). See also Universal Oil Prods.
Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 581 (1946) (holding that federal court can always
call on government to serve as amicus curiae). The role of government amicus curiae as
a friend of the court is further evinced by the abundance of statutes allowing non-judicial
branches of government to participate in litigation as amicus curiae. See e.g. 5 U.S.C. §
612(b) (1988) (authorizing Chief Counsel for Advocacy of Small Business Administration to appear as amicus curiae); 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2(8) (1988) (authorizing Commodity
Futures Trading Commission to appear as amicus curiae); 29 U.S.C. § 792(d)(2)(B)
(1982) (authorizing Executive Director of Architectural and Transportation Barriers
Compliance Board to appear as amicus curiae); 15 U.S.C. § 3207(b)(2) (1988) (authorizing Secretary of Commerce to appear as amicus curiae); 15 U.S.C. § 3415(b)(2) (1988)
(authorizing Secretary of Energy to appear as amicus curiae). Compare DeVonish v.
Garza, 510 F. Supp. 658, 659 (W.D. Tex. 1981) (stating no requirement for legislative
grant of standing for government to appear as amicus curiae) and Laufman v. Oakley
Bldg. & Loan Co., 404 F. Supp. 791,792 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (stating no showing required
of government to serve as amicus curiae when in public interest) with Michigan, 940
F.2d at 164 (recalling traditional purpose of amici as providing court impartial information on matters of public interest) and Miller-Wohl, Inc. v. Commissioner of Labor and
Indus., Mont., 694 F.2d 203, 204 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussing amicus curiae's public
interest role of directing court to law that escaped their attention). But see Rucker v.
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to research and analyze in an effort to inform the court. 5 2 The government is also able to enforce judicial decisions and assist the court in
achieving its ends.53
Government amici's near-party status is also consistent with established legal principles. 54 Article III of the United States Constitution
represents a major obstacle to third party participation in litigation.55
Article III's "separation of powers" doctrine precludes one branch from
encroaching on the domain or exercising the powers of another.56 The
"separation of powers" often becomes an issue when a case involves a
political question.5 7 Permitting the legislative and executive branches to
serve as amici allow the courts to address political questions without
infringing on the legislative or executive branches.5 8
An additional Article III protection is the "standing to sue" doctrine. 59 "Standing to sue" requires that the party have a sufficient stake
in an otherwise justiciable controversy to warrant judicial resolution. 6°
Great Scott Supermarkets, 528 F.2d 393, 394 n.2 (6th Cir. 1976), overruled on other
grounds, (refusing filing of amicus brief); Wright v. Tennessee, 628 F.2d 949, 952 (6th
Cir. 1980) (denying Secretary of Labor permission to file amicus brief because redundant).
52 See Comment, Amicus Curiae, supra note 15, at 480 (recognizing government's
ability to research and inform court).
'3 See Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 191 F. Supp. 871, 876 (E.D. La. 1961)
(justifying governmental amici curiae because they involve principles vital to effective
administration of justice); Faubus, 254 F.2d at 804-05 (justifying courts appointment of
U.S. Attorney General as amicus curiae to protect and effectuate its orders); see also
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1125 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (recognizing
amici assisting court have greater authority than amici assisting defendant).

See infra notes 55-68 and accompanying text (discussing how representing public interest makes existence of government amici proper).
"See supra note 2, and accompanying text (discussing standing requirements).
6See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1365 (6th ed. 1990).
67

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1358 (6th ed. 1990). The "political question
doctrine" states that certain issues are more appropriately handled by another government branch and therefore should not be decided by the courts. Id.
" See Lowman, supra note 14, at 1262 (noting governmental amici involvement
give federal courts "detached objectivity and enhances its image as decision-maker").
9 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972) (requiring concrete
stake in outcome of controversy for standing to sue).
60See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1405 (6th ed. 1990).

Standing is a requirement that the plaintiffs have been injured or been
threatened with injury by governmental action complained of, and focuses
on the question of whether the litigant is the proper party to fight the lawsuit, not whether the issue itself is justiciable. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n., D.C.N.C., 431
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Courts have consistently held that matters of public interest outweigh
"standing to sue" requirements.61 Several examples of public interest
matters include the distribution of governmental power and extensive
civil wrongs. 62 "Standing to sue" is rarely an issue where the government is representing the public interest. 63
Although governmental amici are given broad powers, these powers are not absolute. 64 For example, governmental amici do not ultimately control the litigation. 65 Furthermore, government amici may not
use the original party as a proverbial strawman to express their own
views. 6 These limits to government power are sufficient to prevent the
government from abusing its amicus status to subvert the interests of a
named party.6 7 When the government is acting in the public interest and
within the above-mentioned limits, the government is acting as a friend

F.Supp. 203, 218. Essence of standing is that no person is entitled to assail
the constitutionality of an ordinance or statute except as he himself is adversely affected by it. Sandoval v. Ryan, Colo.App., 535 P.2d 233, 247.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1405-06 (6th ed. 1990).

6'See e.g. DeVonish v. Garza, 510 F. Supp. 658, 659 (W.D. Tex. 1981) (stating
that government amici curiae do not require legislative grant of standing); Laufman v.
Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 404 F. Supp. 791, 792 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (stating no showing
required of government to serve as amicus curiae when in public interest).
6
2 See United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 915 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (allowing
North Carolina to appear as amicus curiae and support constitutionality of state statute);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (using amicus to determine interplay
between executive power and power of legislature and individual rights).
6' Cf. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1947) (supporting grant of
broad powers to U.S. Attorney General to litigate government rights and property).
See generally United States v. Texas, 356 F. Supp. 469, 473 (E.D. Tex. 1971)
(authorizing amicus curiae to enforce district court's judgment); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1125 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (authorizing amicus curiae to present
and question witnesses); Northside Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Texas Educ. Agency, 410 F.
Supp. 360, 362-63 (W.D. Tex. 1975) (authorizing amicus curiae to conduct discovery).
See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1260 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding error where
amici control litigation).
See id (ruling it is error for government to use named party as strawman to present its views).
17 See generally Edmond R. Beckwith & Rudolph Sobernheim,
Amicus CuriaeMinisterof Justice, 17 FORDHAM L. REV. 38, 40-42 (1948) (stating that private amici
limitations do not apply to governmental amici informing on public interest); George C.
Piper, Note, Amicus Curiae Participation-Atthe Court's Discretion, 55 KY. L.J. 864, 870
(1967) (allowing government amici participation in certain circumstances).
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to the court in accordance with the original intent of the doctrine of amicus curiae. 68

B. Private Amici
Private party amici curiae began modestly in America: They
were, simply, friends of the court. 69 Unlike their governmental counterparts, private amici lacked standing and were not afforded many of the
rights traditionally granted to named parties.7 ° One advantage of their
non-party status was the inapplicability of res judicata.7 1
Private amici did not become litigating amici overnight.72 The
process evolved slowly and consisted of a series of steps evidenced by
three cases.7 3 The initial step in the process occurred in the decision of
See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (discussing traditional role of
amicus curiae). As an example of the effectiveness of government amici and the level to
which they have risen, one need only look to the amicus briefs of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. David S. Ruder, The Development of Legal Doctrine Through
Amicus Participation:The SEC Experience, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 1167, 1173 (1989). See
e.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953) (adopting position offered by amicus); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp. 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960) (following
amicus' argument). See generally McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 788 F.2d
94, 100 n.8 (2d Cir. 1986) (commenting that Securities and Exchange Commission brief
would have been helpful); Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654,
659 (7th Cir. 1979) (Stevens, J.) (citing SEC brief, as amicus curiae, in Superintendent of
Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)).
See Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580-81 (recognizing that private amici previously served court). See generally Skandia Am. Reinsurance
Corp. v. Schneck, 441 F. Supp. 715, 718 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (relying on amicus' liquidation and insolvency determinations which are beyond purview of court); Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989) (discussing issue raised in amicus brief); Alexander v.
Hall, 64 F.R.D. 152, 155 (D.S.C. 1974) (emphasizing that amicus curiae is not party to
litigation but only assists court in public interest).
70
See Ex Parte Leaf Tobacco Bd., 222 U.S. 578, 581 (1911) (holding non-party
not entitled to appeal); Moten v Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers Int'l Union of Am.,
543 F.2d 224, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding participating amicus is non-party and therefore not entitled to appeal); FED. R. APP. P. 29 (allowing amicus curiae's motion to participate in oral argument only for extraordinary reasons).
71 See Munoz v. County of Imperial, 667 F.2d 811,816-17 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding
amicus status alone does not invoke res judicata), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
7 See infra notes 72-85 and accompanying text (discussing evolution of private
amici from neutral party to litigating party status).

73See supra notes 18-31 and accompanying text (discussing factors that have
transformed amicus curiae doctrine).
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Wyatt v. Stickney.74 In Wyatt, government and private party amici
worked side-by-side as litigating amici. 75 Although private amici were
bound by their governmental counterparts, the case conferred rights on
private parties that had previously been reserved for named parties and
76
government amici.
The next step toward litigating amicus status occurred as a result
of EEOC v. Boeing Co.7 7 The EEOC court allowed the private amicus to
supplement the EEOC's position.78 Consequently, the rights afforded to
private amici included the right to participate in trial, to receive all
pleadings, to consult with the EEOC prior to final settlement offers, to
participate jointly in motions, to be present at all depositions, and to file
briefs.7 9 Private amici were still not allowed to conduct discovery, file
motions by themselves, or to reject the government's final settlement
proposals. 0
Private amici underwent their final evolution toward becoming
litigating amici curiae in United States v. Michigan.s l In that case, the
private party amici curiae achieved and lost their status as litigating
amici 8 2 Due to the public interest and complexity of the case, Judge
Enslen allowed the private amicus to serve as both a friend of the court
and a representative of a third party interest8 3 Judge Enslen eventually
gave the private party or "Knop class" all of the rights of a named
party.84 Indeed, the Knop class enjoyed a status greater than that of a

74344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
75See id. at

ings).

375 n.3 (allowing both named parties and amici to participate in hear-

7

See id. (referring to all amici as one entity); id. at 375-76. (observing amici as
having submitted briefs, proposed standards, and given testimony).
77 109

7 See

F.R.D. 6 (W.D. Wash. 1985).

id. at 11 (affording third-party role in litigation in spite of not satisfying requirements for intervention).
7
, See id. (affording rights to third-party, which allow them to assist named party
prepare for trial).
See id (limiting rights afforded to third-party).
s See 116 F.R.D. 655, 660-61 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (requesting full litigating amicus
status because nominal plaintiff did not adequately represent their interests).
Compare State of Michigan, 116 F.R.D. at 660-61 (granting litigating amicus
status) with United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 160 (6th Cir.1991) (revoking litigating amicus status).
See State of Michigan, 116 F.R.D. at 660-61 (granting amicus curiae status).
See id. The Knop class received rights that were previously withheld from private amici including filing a motion to modify, amending a consent decree, or the ability
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named party because res judicata did not apply. 85 It would be only a
matter of time before their status would be challenged.86

C. JudicialReview
Recent judicial review of amicus curiae doctrine has not distinguished between private and government amici. 87 The propriety of governmental amici, however, as discussed in section III (A) above, would
suggest the private amicus as the focus of the judiciary's ideological retreat. 88 Holdings in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, as well as, the Supreme Court's own amendments and recommendations evince this interpretation .89
The Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court's holding in United
States v. State of Michigan.90 Taking issue with the court-constructed
"litigating amicus curiae," the court held:
To condone the fiction of "litigating amicus curiae," in
reality an extra-judicial, de facto named party/real party
in interest, would extend carte blanche discretion to a
trial judge to convert the trial court into a free-wheeling
forum of competing special interest groups capable of
frustrating and undermining the ability of the named
parties/real parties in interest to expeditiously resolve
their own dispute and capable of complicating the court's
ability to perform its judicial function. 9'

to enforce these privileges with the threat of contempt proceedings. Michigan, 940 F.2d
at 162-64.
See Michigan, 940 F.2d at 165 (noting amici not bound by judgments which
permitted them to brief or argue).
wSee infra notes 89-103 and accompanying text (discussing judicial review of
granting litigating amicus status).
87

See infra note 89-103 and accompanying text (noting that language used in court
opinions does not distinguished between private and government amici).
See supra note 48-66 and accompanying text (assuming from court opinions and
government amici's public interests that judiciary's focus is private amici).
89
See infra note 90-103 and accompanying text (referencing appellate cases and
Supreme Court amendments for judiciary's stance on amicus curiae doctrine).
90See Michigan, 940 F.2d at 166-67 (finding that third-party lacked standing to
exercise litigating rights equal to named party).
9'Id. at 166.
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The court likened the district court's ruling to the opening of a Pandora's
box. 92 Circuit Judge Krupansky concluded that the Knop class was without standing and therefore precluded from exercising any litigating
rights.93 Although, the Sixth Circuit's ruling prevented the Knop class
from performing the functions of a named party,
it did not impair the
94
class' participation as a traditional amicus curiae.
The Seventh Circuit has taken even greater strides to curb the
abuses of the doctrine of amicus curiae in Ryan v. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n.95 The Ryan court recognized that the adversarial capacity of the amicus curiae was well accepted.96 The court held that an
amicus brief is only proper when a party is not adequately represented,
when the amicus has an interest in another lawsuit that will be affected
by the decision in the present
case, or when the party has additional in97
formation for the court.
The Supreme Court also reacted to the growing number of private
litigating amici by amending Sup. Ct. R. 37 and prescribing revisions to
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.9" Sup. Ct. R. 37 now requires
disclosure of authorship and sponsorship. 99 FED. R. APP. P. 29 now requires the standard proffered by Ryan decision, namely, that the party
seeking leave of the court to file an amicus brief must state "why a brief
of an amicus curiae is desirable."'13° The rule provides that the amicus
See id. (predicting that expanding amicus curiae doctrine would result in legal
confusion).
" See id. (finding that amicus did not satisfy intervention requirements to allow
litigating rights).
" See id. (holding that traditional amicus curiae doctrine still applies).
95 125

F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 1997).

"See id. at 1063 (recognizing acceptance of amicus curiae).
97 See id. (redefining amicus curiae doctrine in context of America's
adversarial

legal system).
"See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (utilizing disclosure requirements
to limit abuse of amicus curiae mechanism).
"See Sup. CT. RULE 37 (West 1999). Rule 37 provides:
Except for briefs presented on behalf of amicus curiae listed in Rule 37.4,
a brief filed under this Rule shall indicate whether counsel for a party
authored the brief in whole or in part and shall identify every person or
entity, other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, who made
a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of the brief. The
disclosure shall be made in the first footnote on the first page of text.
Id.
'oo
Compare FED.R.APP.P. 29 (West 1999) (requiring disclosure of how amicus
brief will aid court) with Ryan 125 F.3d at 1064 (suggesting that anicus briefs be al-

lowed

only when they aid court).
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brief is no longer due on the date the named party's brief is due but is
due up to one week later.'0 ' Although this may appear temporally sympathetic, it actually demands stricter compliance with Rule 29: It affords
the amicus an opportunity to review the named party's brief and ensure
that the amicus brief is not a restatement of the named party's
argument. 1°2 Further, the rule requires the motion for leave to file an
0 3
amicus brief be filed with the amicus brief, rather than in advance.1
Having read the named parties' briefs, the Court requires the amicus to
adhere more closely with Rule 29 while also providing the courts with a
simple threshold mechanism to respond to attorneys who fail to
comply.1°4 Due to the novelty of these provisions, their effect on attorney conduct and their actual utility in the courts is still unknown.

IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE COURTS' TREATMENT OF AMICUS
CURIAE
Amici curiae have evolved from being friends of the court without bias to being advocates and lobbyists with their own agendas. 0 5
Notwithstanding the Sixth and Seventh Circuit decisions, a question remains whether this new concept of amicus curiae, litigating or otherwise,
is acceptable in our society. As described above, government amici are
consistent with established legal principles as they work to further the
public interest."06 Therefore, even as a litigating party, government amici
are proper. 0 7 Private party litigating amici, however, are inappropriate,

101

See FED. R. APP. P. 29 (e) (West 1999).

'02 See David B. Smallman, Amicus Practice: New Rules for Old Friends, 1999
SEC. LIG., Vol. 25 No. 2 (noting that prior to FED. R. APP. P. 29 (e) amicus did not
have opportunity to review principal brief).
'03

See FED. R. APP. P. 29.

'" See Smallman, supra note 102 (noting amici must consider principal briefs
when they write their own briefs and motions).
'06 See e.g. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d at 1260 (advocating for prisoner rights); In
Re Estelle, 516 F.2d at 483-85 (lobbying on behalf of prisoners); Faubus v. United
States, 254 F.2d at 804-05 (lobbying for enforcement of school desegregation order).
'"6 See supra notes 48-66 and accompanying text (discussing how government
amici maintain objectivity in adversarial system in their pursuit of public interest).

'0' See supra notes 48-66 and accompanying text (discussing how pursuit of public
interest avoids abuse of amicus curiae doctrine).
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because they are inconsistent with established legal doctrine: they do not
further policy goals or a philanthropic agenda. 0 8
Private parties may not serve as litigating amici, because it conflicts with Article III and the Federal Rules.It 9 Congress has used the
Federal Rules to specify the instances in which third parties may be represented, e.g., class actions, compulsory joinder, and intervention. " The
case and controversy and standing requirement of Article III are another
impediment to private third party participation in litigation."' It is, in
part, because of these obstacles that private parties are pursuing litigating
amici status. ' 2 Affording private amici with the same rights as named
parties would3 be a prolific source of legal confusion for the bench, bar,
and public."

V. FRIENDLY ADVICE FOR THE AMICUS CURIAE
Amicus briefs are no longer a rare occurrence. ' 14 Many commentators argue that the proliferation of amicus briefs promote efficient5
litigation by consolidating lawsuits and preserving judicial resources."
'08 See Lowman, supra notel4 at 1280 (noting that private parties have their own

agenda, absent broad policy goals of government amici).
'0 See supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text (discussing limits placed on private amici because of their non-public agendas).
110 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (West 1999) (outlining requirements for class actions);
FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (West 1999) (outlining requirements for compulsory joinder); FED. R.
Civ. P. 24 (West 199) (outlining requirements for intervention).
..See U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2, cl. 1 (requiring that cases "aris[e] under this Constitution").
112 See Lowman, supra note 14, at 1256-58 (utilizing amicus curiae mechanism to
circumvent obstacles set up by Federal Rules and Constitution); but see Lowman, supra
note 14, at 1265-66 (suggesting reasons for private parties to pursue litigating amicus
status, e.g., vaguely defined, high profile cases).
"' See United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 166 (6th Cir. 1991) (describing
judicial construct of litigating amicus as inconsistent with Constitution, Federal Rules,
and adversarial system).
4
See Howard, supra, note 6 at 255 (noting that 416 amicus briefs were filed in
114 cases in Supreme Court in 1982, i.e., 80% out of total of 142 cases); Susan Hedman,
Friendsof the Earth and Friendsof the Court: Assessing the Impact of Interest Group

Amici Curiaein EnvironmentalCases Decided by the Supreme Court, 10 VA. ENVT'L
L.J. 187 (1991) (observing that U.S. Supreme Court now reviews more amici briefs than
party briefs).
..See United States v. State of Michigan, 116 F.R.D. 655, 662 (W.D. Mich 1987)
(stating that concern about resources played role in granting litigating amici status).
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In reality, amici, in the absence of rules governing amicus briefs, actually
impede litigation.' 16 If private party amici are allowed to represent partisan interests, there must be limits." 7 One approach would be for Congress to add a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure as it has with the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure.' 8 This would be consistent with the legislature's traditional role as the branch that regulates the relationship
between named parties and third parties. ' 9
The Supreme Court has taken the first step by amending Rule
37.6 and requiring disclosure of authorship if a named party authored the
brief party and sponsorship if amicus did not pay for the brief. 20 The
amicus curiae doctrine could be strengthened, if the rules of other courts
to identify themselves and exrequired the same, i.e., requiring amici
12
plain how they expect to aid the court.'
Courts, especially on the appellate level, are not simply deciding
controversies but are generating judicial precedent. 22 Bringing potential
precedential ramifications to the court's attention and helping the court
23
to avoid error should be the focus of the amicus curiae doctrine.
Amici curiae do not serve these ends by simply echoing a party position;
they should use their expertise generally and focus on the ramifications
of a decision rather than focusing on their own interests, determining, for
example, whether a court should hold narrowly or broadly. 24 Although

116

See Michigan, 940 F.2d at 161 (observing that Knop's amicus status proceed-

ings and related events took both time and effort).
n7 See id. (noting hazards of amicus curiae).
"gSee supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text (beginning by Supreme Court's
modification of their rules).
1 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (West 1999) (outlining requirements for class actions);
FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (West 1999) (outlining requirements for compulsory joinder); FED. R.
Civ. P. 24 (West 1999) (outlining requirements for intervention).
'2 See Sup. Ct. Rule 37.6 (West 1999).
12.See generally Ferguson v. Brick, 649 S.W.2d 397, 403 (Ark. 1983) (promoting
nonpartisan advocacy); United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Victory Land Co. Inc.,
410 So. 2d 359, 367 (La. App. 1982) (suggesting that amici offer their perspective rather
than restating party position or introducing new arguments).
'2See Andrew M. Low, Amicus Curiae, 27-FEB COLo. LAW. 37, 38 (1998) (noting precedential implications of appellate decisions); Randy S. Parlee, A Primeron Amicus Curiae Briefs, 62-Nov. Wis. LAW. 14 (1989) (noting importance of court decisions).
23 See Low, supra note 122 at 38 (recognizing ability of amicus curiae to inform
court of possible precedent ramifications).
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the adversarial nature of our legal system will instigate most private
amici toward a party position, amici should strive to be as objective as
possible. Only then will the amicus curiae truly be a friend to the court.

Michael J. Harris

124

See id (providing insight into role of amicus curiae). But see Paul M. Smith,

Discovery, Dollars, Depositions: The Sometimes Troubled Relationship Between Courts
and Their "Friends." LITIG., p. 28; Summer, (1998) (recognizing dangers of Brandeis
Briefs where courts lack expertise and ability to cross examine).

